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GREENBERG, Circuit Judge. 
      This matter comes on before the court on appeal from an order of the 
district 
court entering judgment in favor of plaintiffs and against defendants on 
February 24, 
2000, and from an order of the district court entered February 29, 2000, 
denying the 
defendants' motion for a new trial or for judgment as a matter of law.  
For the reasons set 
forth below, we will affirm. 
             I.  BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
      In 1986, Edward Bacome and Philip Fankhauser, the principals of the 
Epcon 
Group, Inc. and Epmark, Inc. (collectively "Epcon"), Ohio corporations, 
began designing 
architectural plans for ranch-style four-plex condominiums.  In the late 
1980's, Epcon 
developed several projects in Ohio based on their plans, including 
projects known as Deer 
Run, Greystone Manor, Bayberry and Trotters Chase.  Epcon then licensed 
its 
development system, including its architectural plans, to third-party real 
estate 
developers. 
      On May 18, 1989, Epcon entered into a licensing agreement with 
Ashford 
Development Company, signed on behalf of Ashford by its vice president, 
Richard E. 
Hartung, for Ashford's use of Epcon's architectural designs, confidential 
information and 
copyright written material in a development called Ashford Manor located 
in Cranberry 
Township, Pennsylvania.  See supp. app. at 41a-42a; Appellants' Br. at 6.  
Then, in 1992, 
without a license agreement, Hartung used Epcon's plans to develop a 
second project 
called Cambridge Manor in Springdale Township, Pennsylvania.  See supp. 
app. at 59a, 
62a.  When Epcon discovered that its plans were used in the latter 
project, it sued a 
number of defendants including appellants Richard E. Hartung, Cambridge 
Manor, Inc. 
and Ashford Development Company (collectively "Hartung").   
      Epcon filed its complaint in July 1996 in the district court 
alleging, inter alia, that 
Hartung infringed Epcon's copyright in violation of 17 U.S.C.  101, et 
seq. (the 
"Copyright Act"), and misappropriated its trade secrets.  Following a 
trial in February 
2000, the jury on February 11, 2000, returned a verdict in Epcon's favor, 
awarding it 
$114,735.15 in compensatory and $68,571.00 in punitive damages.  The court 
entered 
judgment on the verdict on February 24, 2000, and on February 29, 2000, 
denied  
Hartung's motion for a new trial or judgment as a matter of law under Fed. 
R. Civ. P. 50 
and 59.  Hartung then timely appealed. 
                        II.  DISCUSSION  
      Hartung first asserts that the district court erroneously held that 
Epcon did not 
publish its drawings - a critical point for if it had, it might have lost 
its copyright 
protection.  See 17 U.S.C.  405.  He argues that the district court, 
finding that the 
evidence showed that Epcon only submitted material to the appropriate 
municipal 
agencies, ignored evidence that Epcon's drawings were distributed to 
"prospective 
contractors, banks and lending institutions, potential home buyers, and 
potential 
licensees."  See Appellants' Br. at 5, 8 and 15.  He further asserts that 
Epcon submitted its 
drawings to the Columbus, Ohio, City Council for the Deer Run project in 
1986 without a 
copyright notice.  See id. at 7-8.  Thus, Hartung contends that because 
distribution 
occurred before 1988, see 17 U.S.C.  405(b), and because not all copies 
of Epcon's plans 
bore copyright notices, the district court erred in finding that Epcon did 
not publish its 
work. 
      However, Hartung does not cite case law to support his assertion 
that distribution 
limited to necessary third parties, such as subcontractors or lending 
institutions, 
constitutes publication.  See Kunycia v. Melville Realty Co., 755 F. Supp. 
566, 574 
(S.D.N.Y. 1990) (stating that distribution "to those persons without whose 
participation 
the plans could not be given practical effect," including contractors, 
landlords and 
building authorities, was not publication).  Moreover, at the close of the 
evidence, 
Hartung admitted that the only evidence of publication was Epcon's 
distribution of its 
drawings to government agencies.  See app. at 63a, 65a, 66a and 67a.  Such 
"judicial 
admissions are binding for the purpose of the case in which the admissions 
are made 
including appeals."  Glick v. White Motor Co., 458 F.2d 1287, 1291 (3d 
Cir. 1972).  
Relying on the representations of Hartung's counsel, the district court 
found that "[t]he 
only evidence of distribution contained in the record of this case 
indicates that plaintiffs 
have submitted copies of the plans to the appropriate governmental 
authorities for 
purposes of obtaining the required building permits.  No further evidence 
of further 
distribution to the general public has been introduced."  Supp. app. at 
69a-70a.  
Accordingly, we reject Hartung's publication argument. 
      Hartung next contends that the district court erred in not setting 
aside the jury's 
award of punitive damages, asserting that the jury improperly may have 
based its award 
on Epcon's copyright infringement claim rather than the misappropriation 
of trade secrets 
claim.  Despite his assertion, Hartung recognizes that the district court 
instructed the jury 
that it properly could award punitive damages only if it found liability 
with respect to 
Epcon's trade secrets claim and could not award punitive damages on its 
copyright claim.  
See Appellants' Br. at 9.  Nonetheless, he argues that the instructions 
and verdict slip 
"make it impossible to determine the basis for the jury's awarding 
punitive damages in 
the amount of $68,571 and further impossible to determine whether any 
portion thereof 
arose from a finding of liability on the copyright infringement claim."  
Id. at 9.  Hartung's 
contention is entirely without merit. 
      Hartung neither objected to the jury instructions nor to the form of 
the verdict 
slip.  See Appellants' Br. at 9.  See also Fashauer v. New Jersey Transit 
Rail Operations, 
Inc., 57 F.3d 1269, 1288-89 (3d Cir. 1995) (describing procedure for 
preserving objection 
to jury charge); Fed. R. Civ. P. 51 (stating that "a party may not assign 
as error defects in 
jury instructions unless the party distinctly stated its objection before 
the jury retired to 
consider its verdict").  Instead, he cites BMW of North America, Inc. v. 
Gore, 517 U.S. 
559, 116 S.Ct. 1589 (1996), and Shiner v. Moriarty, 706 A.2d 1228 (Pa. 
Super. Ct. 1998), 
arguing that it is "impossible to determine that none of the punitive 
damages were 
awarded as a result of the finding of liability for copyright 
infringement."  Appellants' Br. 
at 19.   
      BMW of North America, however, stands for the proposition that the 
due 
process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is violated when a punitive 
damage award is 
"grossly excessive" in relation to a state's legitimate interests in 
punishing unlawful 
conduct and deterring its repetition.  See 517 U.S. at 568, 116 S.Ct. at 
1595 (reversing 
$2,000,000.00 punitive damages award where actual harm to plaintiff was 
$4,000.00). 
Accordingly, BMW of North America addresses an issue distinct from that 
here.  
Moreover, the jury awarded Epcon $114,735.15 in compensatory damages and 
$68,571.00 in punitive damages and thus is not a case where the 
relationship of the actual 
harm to the award of punitive damages is so disproportionate as to shock 
this court's 
"constitutional sensibilities."  Shiner, 706 A.2d at 1242 (citation 
omitted).  Consequently, 
BMW of North America does not aid Hartung even on the point it addressed. 
      Likewise, Shiner does not help Hartung.  In Shiner, the jury awarded 
punitive 
damages after finding for the plaintiffs on all three counts of their 
complaint.  See 706 
A.2d at 1234.  However, on appeal, the Superior Court of Pennsylvania 
determined that 
the defendants' motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict should 
have been 
granted as to two of the three claims.  The court recognized that the 
jury's award of 
punitive damages had been made collectively on the basis of all three 
theories of 
recovery, without regard to each specific claim.  See id. at 1242.  Thus, 
the jury could 
properly assess damages only on the sole remaining claim, leading the 
court to hold that 
inasmuch as it was not possible to determine from the verdict slip which 
portion of the 
damages was attributable to that claim, a new trial on damages was 
required. 
      In contrast, in this case the jury returned a verdict in Epcon's 
favor on both its 
copyright claim and on its misappropriation of trade secrets claim.  Both 
the jury 
instructions and the verdict slip made it clear that the award of punitive 
damages only 
related to the trade secrets misappropriation claim.  The court stated: 
"you may not award 
punitive damages with respect to plaintiffs' copyright claim; you may only 
consider 
punitive damages in connection with plaintiffs' claim for misappropriation 
of trade 
secrets."  App. at 23a.  The verdict slip also linked punitive damages 
only to the trade 
secrets claim: "Question four: The jury, having found in favor of the 
plaintiff and against 
defendant Richard E. Hartung on the misappropriation of trade secrets 
claim, awards 
plaintiffs punitive damages in the amount of $68,571."  App. at 25a.  
Regardless of 
whether the verdict slip linked Epcon's claims as to the award of 
compensatory damages, 
the instructions and the verdict slip are both clear and unambiguous with 
regard to 
punitive damages.  They do not misstate the law and would not mislead a 
jury, who is 
assumed understand and follow the court's instructions.  See, e.g., 
Loughman v. Consol- 
Pennsylvania Coal Co., 6 F.3d 88, 105 (3d Cir. 1993) (citations omitted).  
Accordingly, 
the judgment of February 24, 2000, and the order of February 29, 2000 will 
be affirmed. 
                              ____ 
TO THE CLERK: 
      Please file the foregoing memorandum opinion. 
 
                                /s/Morton I. Greenberg                              
                                             Circuit Judge 
 
 
